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A B S T R A C T
Interdisciplinary energy research is essential. It advances our understanding of potential transitions from high to
low carbon energy systems. However, it is easier to propose than deliver. It requires translation into a simpler
language, to aid communication, but not at the expense of the conceptual language that drives our under-
standing of complex energy systems. We combine legal, political science, and policy studies to show how to
balance the need to communicate accessibly and recognise legal and policymaking complexity. We begin with a
statement so accepted in legal studies that it has become a truism: the law in the books is not the same as the law
in action. The allocation of legal competences is only one inﬂuence on policymaking in a complex system. We
describe three key ways to conceptualise this relationship between law, policy, and energy systems, focusing on
the: (1) ‘on paper’ legal separation of powers between diﬀerent governments, (2) interaction between law and
policy in practice, including blurry boundaries between formal responsibility and informal inﬂuence, and (3)
role of law as one of many contributors to policymaking. We use these approaches to explain the implications of
Brexit for UK energy policy.
1. Introduction
It is a truism that law in action is not the same as the law in the
books. Energy lawyers ought to be more aware of this than most.
Energy law has always been a practical discipline, driven by the real
world problems thrown up by changes in energy technologies or, above
all, by developments in political, social and economic beliefs, producing
changes in energy policies (Daintith, 2012). As such, it is an inherently
interdisciplinary subject (Bradbrook, 1996: 206; Heﬀron et al., 2018:
480). Energy lawyers have sought to learn from other disciplines to
better understand the nature of the legal problems to be addressed in
the energy system and to ﬁnd creative, practical solutions. In recent
years, however, energy law scholarship has been changing. Energy law
academics have been concerned to strengthen the disciplinary core of
the subject (eg Heﬀron and Talus, 2016; Heﬀron et al., 2018), moti-
vated in part by the desire to highlight the important contribution that
legal analysis can make to interdisciplinary energy research. Energy
systems are themselves increasingly understood as multi-disciplinary in
nature, thus requiring interdisciplinary collaboration to address major
energy policy problems, such as how to transition from high to low
carbon energy systems. Energy law is thus to be understood not merely
as the provider of technical solutions to problems framed and resolved
through other disciplinary lenses, but as a central element in the suc-
cessful societal management of energy resources. Nevertheless, it is
important not to forget the key insights of energy law as an applied
rather than pure discipline, and of the need to understand how the law
in the books may diﬀer from the law in practice.
Bearing in mind the importance of energy policy as a driver for
changes in energy law, one major – but hitherto somewhat neglected -
focus for interdisciplinary energy law scholarship is to work with policy
scientists to understand the production of energy policy and the way in
which the law interacts with and shapes – or fails to shape – the energy
policy process, and how this process aﬀects the energy system. In this
article, we seek to address this gap in the literature by showing how
energy lawyers and policy scientists can learn from one another to
better understand and seek to solve major policy problems.
To actually deliver meaningful interdisciplinary collaboration is
easier said than done. Each discipline has its own reference points – to a
foundational literature, set of key concepts, and language to commu-
nicate research – and they are often not accessible to scholars and
practitioners from other backgrounds. A simple process of translation
into plain English will not solve this problem completely, because a
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conceptual and technical language refers to a body of knowledge (about
a complex topic) that cannot be picked up so easily. Therefore, we need
ways to translate our knowledge across disciplines in a way that sim-
pliﬁes initial discussions before highlighting the best ways to invest
further time to generate a more in-depth understanding.
We demonstrate this argument conceptually by highlighting the
contribution of legal analysis as part of a wider interdisciplinary con-
tribution from law, political science, and policy studies to the study of
energy policy. We then use the case study of multi-level policymaking
in the UK - as it prepares for Brexit – to show how to apply such ana-
lysis. Our discussion highlights the beneﬁt of many levels of conceptual
understanding of the same issue, from a face value identiﬁcation of the
powers of diﬀerent governments, to a conceptually-informed discussion
of the use of powers in practice, and a more technical discussion of
policy in a complex policymaking system.
The ﬁrst approach is the easiest to pick up and understand: we can
study multi-level policymaking, and the impact of Brexit on UK energy
policymaking, by identifying who is responsible for policy. Therefore,
our ﬁrst aim is to identify which levels of government, and government
agencies, control the policy instruments which relate to energy policy
directly (such as the regulation of the electricity market) and indirectly
(such as policy for land use or transport).
However, the allocation of energy decision-making competences
across levels of government is only one factor in determining how
policy is actually made. Legal and policy studies suggest that many
actors draw on other sources of political and decision-making authority
to make and inﬂuence policy. Consequently, our second aim is to
analyse how governments make sense of the division of legal powers in
practice, when they make decisions individually or cooperate via in-
tergovernmental relations (IGR) to produce a more coordinated
strategy. Such analysis highlights the need to deﬁne policy in con-
siderable detail and account for the contingent nature of policymaking
in which, for example, some levels have primary responsibility but a
limited willingness or ability to enforce policy.
This uncertain relationship between the law and policy is starkest
when we engage in ‘whole systems’ thinking and consider the wider
relationship between legal authority, policy, and the context in which
policymaking takes place. Consequently, our third aim is describe
policymaking as a complex system from which outcomes often appear
to ‘emerge’ without central government control. This approach helps to
account for the fact that law and policy are among many inﬂuences on
energy outcomes, as well as address a tendency in energy studies to
identify an often-limited role for law and policymaking as part of a
larger dynamic relationship between ‘the set of technologies, physical
infrastructure, institutions, policies and practices located in and asso-
ciated with the UK which enable energy services to be delivered to UK
Table 1
Distribution of Energy Decision-Making Competences.
Level Direct Competences Indirect Competences
European Union Internal energy market (gas and electricity) State aid regulation
Security of energy supply Competition law
Promotion of renewable energy Free movement law
Regulation of biofuels Greenhouse gas emissions trading
Promotion of energy eﬃciency/energy eﬃciency standards Other atmospheric emissions
Energy networks Water quality
Trade in and safety of nuclear materials (Euratom) Environmental Impact Assessment
Oﬀshore carbon storage
Trans-European networks
Innovation/R&D funding
Structural funding & strategic funding (e.g. in transport and energy
infrastructure)
EU Agencies Cross-border market integration and network harmonisation (ACER)
United Kingdom/Great Britain Ownership of energy resources (coal, gas, oil, gas storage rights vested
in the Crown)
Competition law
Regulation of energy markets Financial services regulation
Licensing of energy producers, suppliers and network operators Intellectual property and commercial law
Security of energy supply Climate change laws
Energy taxation Social security (winter fuel payments; energy debt payments)
Renewable energy subsidies/grants Workplace health and safety
Energy eﬃciency subsidies/grants Emergency powers
Nuclear energy Golden Shares Treaty-making powers
Nuclear licensing and nuclear safety R&D funding
UK/GB Agencies Gas and electricity market regulation (Ofgem) Competition law (Competition and Markets Authority)
Coal mining licensing (Coal Authority) Financial services regulation (Financial Conduct Authority)
Regulation of oil and gas exploration (Oil and Gas Authority) Health and safety (Health and Safety Executive)
Nuclear safety (Oﬃce for Nuclear Regulation)
Nuclear decommissioning (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority)
Devolved Promotion of renewable energy Crown estate (seabed use/storage rights)
Promotion of energy eﬃciency Marine licensing and planning
Fuel poverty support systems Property law (access to land/subsoil; nuisance; servitudes and
wayleaves)
Electricity and gas installations consents Environmental emissions & water quality
Onshore oil and gas licensing Climate change law
Nuclear waste storage Environmental Impact Assessment
Housing law/building regulations
Economic development
Social security law
Transport policies (including Air Passenger Duty from 2016)
Devolved Agencies Environmental emissions and water quality (SEPA)
Seabed leasing (Crown Estate Scotland)
Local Land-use planning
Note: each of the three devolved administrations has diﬀering levels of energy competence. E.g. energy/gas regulation has a GB-wide basis because it is a devolved
matter for NI, not Scotland and Wales.
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consumers’ (Chaudry et al., 2009: iv). As such, it is crucial to our un-
derstanding of the role of government in a sustainable energy transition
(Chilvers et al., 2017).
This approach helps demonstrate that (a) major constitutional
changes – such as the process of Brexit – will have a signiﬁcant impact
on UK energy policymaking, but (b) the eﬀect of any change in the
allocation of legal and policymaking competences is diﬃcult to an-
ticipate. We need useful models and theories to help us better under-
stand (a) how to deﬁne policy and policy change, from signal of intent
to actual outcomes, and (b) the complex interaction between formal
decision-making competences and other factors inﬂuencing the energy
policymaking process, to appreciate fully (c) the eﬀect of constitutional
change on the policy process.
We identify the new opportunities and constraints that Brexit may
create for old and new policy communities. We accentuate new forms of
multi-level policymaking, in which the UK is repatriating some com-
petences from the EU but also coordinating a delegated governance
model in which devolved and local government (and government
agencies) have a signiﬁcant role in policy to inﬂuence energy demand
and supply. We focus on government in Scotland to provide a concrete
example of delegated governance under a wider UK framework.
2. Approach one: many governments share energy policy
responsibilities
At face value, the division of legal competences and policymaking
responsibilities is relatively clear, allowing us to map out the respective
roles of governments, at each level, for energy policy and non-energy
policies with a major impact such as transport and planning. In Table 1
we divide energy policy competences according to levels of govern-
ment, note the extent to which governments delegate responsibility to
agencies (who operate with some operational autonomy from minis-
ters), and note the types of non-energy policy responsibilities with an
eﬀect on energy demand and supply (see also Fredriksson et al., 2017;
Pollitt, 2017). We recognise that energy systems are also subject to
(direct and indirect) international level regulation (Heﬀron and Talus,
2016: 194–6; Redgwell, 2016), and that this is likely to become more
signiﬁcant for UK energy policy post-Brexit. Nevertheless, we exclude
the international level from Table 1, as international policymaking in
the energy sphere is still (atomic energy apart) primarily under the
control of national governments.
Table 1 highlights a large and potentially complicated list of re-
sponsibilities, but suggests that we can generate a working knowledge
of multi-level policymaking. For example, the EU: focuses on key as-
pects of trade and competition, has a major role in the harmonisation of
rules – such as environmental law and state aid regulations - to foster a
level playing ﬁeld in trade and encourage the EU-wide security of
supply, and otherwise promotes key priorities, such as to reduce energy
demand and increase the proportion of energy supply from renewable
sources. The UK government's role also seems quite clear, particularly
when signalling the balance of power between it and devolved and local
governments. The UK is responsible for energy security overall, key
aspects of that security such as the production and regulation of nuclear
energy and the regulation of electricity supply, and access to the mi-
nerals (coal, oil, gas) to produce energy. In that context, the devolved
(and local government) role may seem relatively limited to the delivery
of EU regulations and UK-driven policies, the promotion of measures
inﬂuencing supply and demand, and a suite of devolved policies with a
more indirect impact on energy policy.
3. Approach two: the law in the books is not the policy in action
However, the formal allocation of decision-making competences
only tells a partial story about how the overall policymaking system
operates. In practice, only some responsibilities are relatively clear, and
we can identify many reasons why de facto decision-making powers
may operate diﬀerently from the strict legal picture. This point is cru-
cial to our understanding of multi-level policymaking in relation to
major boundary spanning initiatives. For example, there are several
diﬀerent ways to promote a sustainable energy transition involving ‘the
simultaneous delivery of low carbon, secure and aﬀordable energy
services’, each of which emphasises more or less central government
direction (Chilvers et al., 2017: 440). Further, ideas such as ‘just tran-
sitions’ (Heﬀron and McCauley, 2018) raise the importance of multi-
level policymaking to a process of deliberation, in which governments,
businesses, interest groups, and citizens discuss how to deﬁne and
balance multiple energy-related aims such as sustainability and equi-
table access.
3.1. Some overlaps result from deep constitutional structure
The EU's key decision-making competences in relation to energy and
the environment are, in formal terms, shared rather than exclusive
competences. Member States retain the power to act in these areas
unless and until EU legislators deem it desirable to occupy the ﬁeld
(subject to considerations of proportionality and subsidiarity).
Similarly, in strict constitutional terms, energy is reserved to the
Westminster Parliament for Scotland and Wales, except those areas
listed in Table 1 as excluded from the general reservation. However, the
relationship between the UK and devolved levels may be thought of as
sharing rather than dividing responsibility, because there are no powers
which are exclusively devolved. The UK Parliament retains the power to
legislate for Scotland in devolved areas, or take back devolved powers
to the UK level, subject only to a political requirement to gain the
consent of the Scottish Parliament. This power has been exercised in
relation to energy when the Scottish Parliament agreed to relinquish its
(executively-devolved) powers over the setting of renewable energy
subsidies in favour of a Great Britain-wide approach (Energy Act 2013).
3.2. Some EU powers are designed to promote, not necessarily prescribe
In the energy ﬁeld, the EU has tended to act through the adoption of
framework directives, rather than regulations. Regulations set broad
objectives or targets to be achieved, but leave the Member States con-
siderable freedom (within constraints) to determine how these objec-
tives should be met. Freedom may include some internal divergence of
approach between diﬀerent legislatively-empowered regions within
Member States (R (Horvath) v Secretary of State for Environment,
Fisheries and Rural Aﬀairs, C‐428/07 [2009] 30 EG 66 (CS)). This
approach arises partly as a result of the EU's relatively weak regulatory
capacity, although as its capacity in the energy ﬁeld has increased, so
too has it become more interventionist, as in relation to the internal
energy market (Talus, 2013; Vedder et al., 2016). Further, the EU needs
to cater for divergent political opinion and diﬀering energy needs and
capacities between Member States, which can lead to some retreat, for
instance in relation to the shift back from legally-binding to merely
indicative national renewable energy targets (Revised Renewable En-
ergy Directive 2018/2001/EU, OJ L 328/82).
3.3. Some responsibilities are devolved and Europeanised, which brings the
UK back in
The division of competences between Member State and EU levels
straddles the internal division between devolved and UK levels. As a
matter of domestic law, competences may lie at the devolved level, yet
require to be exercised in accordance with EU law (Scotland Act 1998,
s29(2)(d)). Since the UK Government has the formal competence to
participate in EU decision-making, EU law may act as a signiﬁcantly
centralising force, depriving the devolved government of policymaking
autonomy. Key examples - agricultural, ﬁshing, and environmental
policy – highlight the relevance of EU regulations, in areas such as
water quality, which are implemented by bodies such as SEPA (Scottish
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Environmental Protection Agency) on behalf of the UK. On the other
hand, the EU energy policy framework, despite being an area of mainly
reserved competence in the UK, has allowed the Scottish Government to
contribute disproportionately to UK's EU obligations in renewable en-
ergy.
3.4. There is a general lack of clarity about overlaps in responsibility
On paper, the Scottish Parliament has some relatively clearly de-
ﬁned policy responsibilities, deﬁned as those not reserved to the UK
(Cairney and McGarvey, 2013: 197). Reserved areas include interna-
tional relations, ﬁscal and monetary policy, immigration, employment,
social security, and energy (Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5). Devolved areas
include health, housing, emergency services, and social work. Scotland
also had a separate education, local government, and legal system be-
fore devolution in 1999. Yet, there is less clarity when these responsi-
bilities intersect in practice.
Broad examples in energy include a mix of transport responsibilities,
all of which inﬂuence energy demand (e.g. for air travel) and supply
(e.g. to foster a new ‘hydrogen economy’), and the energy policy in-
frastructure, in which the Scottish government oversees planning con-
sent for electricity generation, power lines, and onshore drilling ap-
plications, while the UK remains responsible for the electricity market,
nuclear power, and renewable energy support (commercial fracking
licensing was devolved in 2018).
Speciﬁc examples highlight problems in deﬁning decision-making
powers. For instance, under the Scotland Act 1998 (Sch 5, Pt 2, Head
D5), energy conservation is reserved, but there is an exception for ‘the
encouragement of energy eﬃciency other than by prohibition or reg-
ulation.’ It is unclear in this context what ‘regulation’ means: does it
refer simply to the imposition of energy eﬃciency obligations on energy
companies, or extend to obligations on consumers? A consensus can
emerge amongst policy actors as to the scope of each decision-making
competence, and it may turn out to be more or less expansive than a
court would decide were the issue to be litigated. A breach in the policy
consensus may result in an expansion or contraction of decision-making
competence without any formal change to the underlying powers.
3.5. Some powers are increasingly shared in complicated ways, in practice
and by design
The reserved powers model employed in the Scotland Act 1998
means that unless a policy area is expressly reserved to the UK level, it
will fall to the devolved level. New policy areas accrue to the devolved
institutions even if they are closely intertwined with other policy areas
which are reserved. Climate change is a good example. At the time of
enactment of the Scotland Act, it was not a high proﬁle policy area, nor
was it anticipated how signiﬁcantly the climate change agenda would
come to aﬀect energy policy. Climate change policy competence
therefore lies at both devolved and UK levels (as well as the EU level),
notwithstanding the general reservation of energy policy. Further, the
Scotland Act 2016 (following the Scotland Act 2012) extends the scope
of Scottish ministerial action in relation to energy eﬃciency and fuel
poverty. In other cases, we ﬁnd the practice of making detailed re-
servations in areas which are otherwise generally devolved (onshore oil
and gas licensing is devolved, but without devolving the power to tax
oil and gas), or making detailed exceptions in areas which are otherwise
generally reserved (nuclear energy is reserved, but nuclear waste dis-
posal is devolved).
3.6. Some UK powers are devolved to Scottish ministers (‘executive
devolution’)
Overlaps may arise from the devolution of executive competences in
areas that are otherwise legislatively reserved. This is a particularly
prominent feature of the division of competences between the UK and
Scottish levels in energy. Scottish ministers have been responsible for
key aspects of UK-controlled policies before and after 1999, although
before 1999 there was more emphasis on ministers with some admin-
istrative discretion to further UK policy (Cairney, 2011: 99).
3.7. Incomplete powers and political vetoes
‘Incomplete’ powers at one level provide some discretion at another.
For instance, the EU's energy policy competence is stated not to ‘aﬀect a
Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its en-
ergy resources, its choice between diﬀerent energy sources and the
general structure of its energy supply’ (Art 192(2) TFEU). In practice,
Member State discretion in these respects is signiﬁcantly constrained by
other aspects of EU law, particularly environmental and competition
law. In the UK, therefore, the shift from (highly polluting) coal-ﬁred
power generation to gas and later renewable generation has been sig-
niﬁcantly (albeit not exclusively) inﬂuenced by EU environmental
policy. Similarly, other Member States have been forced to liberalise
their energy supplies under pressure from EU competition law and EU
policy on completion of the internal energy market (Cameron, 2007).
In some domestic cases, UK ministers have stated or implied that
Scottish ministers are – to all intents and purposes – veto players in
some areas (Cairney, 2011: 99). This longstanding position reﬂects high
levels of popular support for Scottish political autonomy and a histor-
ical tendency for the UK Government to respond accordingly (Cairney
and McGarvey, 2013). If so, the reservation/ devolution of policy re-
sponsibilities tends to result as much from political negotiation as any
regard for the coherence of policymaking responsibilities.
At the domestic level, executive devolution of the power to consent
to the construction of new electricity generating stations has given the
Scottish Government a de facto veto over the construction of new nu-
clear capacity in Scotland, notwithstanding that nuclear power is de
jure a reserved matter. The UK Parliament could choose to override this
de facto veto but this would come at very considerable political cost
which few UK ministers seem willing to incur. Conversely, the devo-
lution of responsibility for licensing onshore oil and gas production
(fracking) to the Scottish Government, but without corresponding de-
volution of the accompanying revenues, aﬀects the policy incentives
governing the exercise of the licensing power.
Some of this delegation of powers extends to devolved and local
government levels in relation to land-use planning, whereby the ex-
ercise of powers of local authorities to grant consent to (usually small-
scale) energy installations is subject to extensive guidance by the
Scottish government, as well as call-in or appeal powers for the Scottish
Ministers in particular cases.
3.8. Legal powers and political reality go hand in hand
Even in the absence of political veto, policymakers may try to ex-
ercise power to address the limits to competence or other resources.
This may include the ability of government to steer relevant actors
through the creation of policy networks or the provision of advice or
assistance, or to exercise policy inﬂuence even where decision-making
power lies elsewhere, gaining ﬁrst mover advantage. For instance, the
status of the UK as a pioneer in the creation of liberalised energy
markets and independent regulatory agencies has given it an inﬂuence
in decision-making in relation to the internal energy market far out-
stripping its formal power as one of 28 EU Member States.
Alternatively, a policymaker may be able to over-reach its formal
decision-making competences in circumstances where others have
weak incentives to contest its actions. The oﬀering of grants or other
ﬁnancial incentives (where this has no clear distorting eﬀects on a
market and therefore does not raise state aid issues) is one example –
something that the Scottish Government has done extensively in rela-
tion to renewable energy, especially at the community scale or to in-
centivise technological innovation. Another example is where one
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decision-maker may rely on another to fulﬁl its own responsibilities.
The UK government has largely acquiesced in the Scottish
Government's carving out of a larger policy role in relation to renew-
able energy than its legal capacity would indicate because this has been
helpful to it in fulﬁlling its own (demanding) obligations to increase UK
renewable energy consumption under the 2009 Renewable Energy
Directive (Directive 2009/28/EC, OJ L 140/16).
Conversely, de facto decision-making power may be less than de
jure competence where a particular decision-maker has weak resources
(such as ﬁnancial or policy capacity). This may turn it from a policy-
maker to a policy-taker, constrained to accept the decisions of more
powerful or better-resourced agencies. Such constraints are magniﬁed
by a wider range of constraints on central government capacity, in-
cluding dependence on industry players, interest groups or political
constituencies, or opposition by independent regulators or advisory
bodies. In these circumstances, a policymaker may acquiesce in the de
facto transfer of decision-making power to another organisation to
overcome its own constraints, or play up the legal constraints imposed
upon it (e.g. by EU law or UK statute) to justify unpopular decisions.
Overall, there are many reasons to suggest that the law in the books
diﬀers from policy in practice, and their combination reminds us to
analyse who is actually, rather than simply formally, responsible.
3.9. The law is one of many contributors to multi-level energy policy
These problems of unclear and variable responsibilities grow when
we try to identify how actors interact to produce what commentators
call ‘policy’ only for the sake of simplicity (Colebatch, 2006). ‘Policy’
can range from statements of intent to actual decisions and their ﬁnal
(intended and unintended) outcomes, and include what governments
choose not to do (Cairney, 2012a). In some cases, policy is the product
of many decisions by many actors in diﬀerent venues. We can track it
primarily with reference to key categories, such as the types of ‘tools’
available to each government, or the policy ‘instruments’ they select.
For example, Hood and Margetts (2007) describe four categories of
tools:
1. Nodality describes being at the centre of the information network
that underpins policy.
2. Authority refers to the power of policymakers provided by the
constitution or country's laws.
3. Treasure describes the money available to support their policy de-
cisions.
4. Organisation describes the resources – such as staﬀ, buildings, and
technology – at their disposal (and the capacity and willingness to
use it for speciﬁc purposes).
Policy scholars also focus on key diﬀerences between areas such as
regulation, exhortation, the direct provision of services, and tax and
spending measures (Bardach, 2009; Birkland, 2005; Howlett et al.,
2009; John, 2012; Lowi, 1988; McCool, 1995; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). Examples of speciﬁc instruments include:
• Public expenditure. How to tax, on which policy areas to spend, and
the balance between current and capital spending.
• Economic penalties, such as taxation on products, or charges to use
services.
• Direct economic incentives, such as subsidies or tax expenditure.
• ‘Nudges’ towards behavioural change.
• Linking government beneﬁts to behaviour or a means test.
• The use of formal regulations or legislation and legal penalties to
control behaviour.
• Voluntary regulations, agreed between governments and actors such
as unions and business.
• Public education and advertising to highlight the risks or beneﬁts to
behaviour.
• Providing services and resources to help change behaviour.
• Funding scientiﬁc research or advisory committee work.
• Organizational change, such as the establishment of a new unit
within a government department or a reform of local government
structures.
• Providing services directly, via non-governmental organizations, or
through networks and quasi-markets.
In multi-level systems, we can measure policy change with reference
to separate responsibilities and the sum total of their individual con-
tributions of policy instruments. However, this is diﬃcult because
‘energy policy’ is such an amorphous term (particularly when we in-
clude non-energy policies with an impact on energy demand and supply
- Cox et al., 2016), and separate governments are often deﬁning policy
problems in diﬀerent ways and producing new instruments with little
reference to other levels and types of government.
Further, studies of politics and policymaking also need to account
for some form of coordinated action, such as in the development of a
common regulatory framework and maintenance of a forum for inter-
action between key actors, including the measures associated with in-
tergovernmental relations (IGR). For present purposes, the latter is
particularly important because IGR in the UK is relatively informal
compared to federal systems in which there is a more routine role for
legal resolution (McEwen et al., 2012).
Energy policy IGR in the UK has been broadly cooperative, informal
and mainly conducted through oﬃcials. Energy has rarely been the
focus of discussions within formal intergovernmental forums like the
Joint Ministerial Committees, except in its European format when dis-
cussed as an agenda item of upcoming European Council meetings. The
Scottish and UK Governments jointly lead the energy work stream
within the British-Irish Council, an intergovernmental forum involving
the UK and devolved governments, alongside the Irish government and
the Crown dependencies, but this is a forum for sharing ideas, objec-
tives and progress, not for co-decision. Intergovernmental relations
tend to be most intense when they revolve around ﬁnancial policy in-
struments, and the Scottish and UK governments were involved in a
long-running dispute about how to allocate revenues collected from the
Fossil Fuel Levy in Scotland. Deft diplomacy between oﬃcials even-
tually resolved that dispute, releasing funds for renewables and green
investment in Scotland. On day-to-day energy matters, policy oﬃcials
in the Scottish Government and in Whitehall have developed positive
relations, despite the party political diﬀerences in government com-
position and some divergent policy preferences.
Intergovernmental cooperation is facilitated by mutual dependence.
For example, the Scottish Government's renewables ambitions support
the UK's EU obligations, but are dependent upon a benevolent UK
regulatory framework that incentivises renewables. Tensions have
emerged in relation to areas regarded as frustrating Scottish energy
ambitions and over which they have no formal control (for example, the
transmission charging regime).
The fact that governments are not the only actors within the pol-
icymaking system may also facilitate cooperative working. This has
been most evident - and most coordinated – in relation to the Scottish
islands, where renewables potential is often frustrated by infrastructure
challenges, grid capacity and connection charges. The Scottish Islands
Renewables Delivery Forum brought together the UK and Scottish
governments, the three island authorities, SSE, National Grid and
Ofgem, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, developers and community
representatives, while governments at every level engaged in sustained
cooperation (and lobbying by sub-state governments) to secure the
European Commission's consent for a state aid exemption for Remote
Island Wind.
By encouraging and potentially frustrating policy ambition, EU
regulatory frameworks can incentivise intergovernmental cooperation.
The extent to which Brexit will alter such incentives will depend on the
nature of the UK-EU relationship, and the extent to which it implies
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continued regulatory compliance. In exploring the impact of Brexit on
those areas where EU law related to energy has hitherto intersected
with devolved competence - including energy performance of buildings
(Directive 2010/31/EU, OJ L 153/13; 2018/844/EU OJ L 156/75),
renewable energy (Directive 2009/28/EU, OJ L 140/16; 2018/2001/
EU, OJ L 328/82), combined heat and power and energy eﬃciency
(Directive 2012/27/EU, OJ L 315/1; 2018/2002/EU, OJ L 328/210) -
the UK and devolved governments agreed to proceed without a
common UK regulatory framework, paving the way for further policy
divergence after Brexit.
4. Approach three: analysing energy policymaking in a complex
system
These problems of clarity reach their peak when we identify and
conceptualise an energy policy process or policymaking environment.
To do so, policy scholars generally draw on particular policy theories to
identify key venues, such as ‘subsystems’ within political systems, and
speciﬁc collections of actors, such as ‘advocacy coalitions’, operating
within them. Further, each theory seeks to conceptualise ﬁve key fac-
tors or concepts to identify the constituent parts of policymaking en-
vironments (Heikkila and Cairney, 2017; Cairney and Weible, 2017;
Cairney, 2016; John, 2003):
1. Actors. There are many actors – policymakers and inﬂuencers - op-
erating in many ‘venues’ (arenas in which authoritative decisions
are made) across many levels and types of government.
2. Institutions. Each venue has developed its own rules, from the formal
rules which are often written down and well understood, to the
informal rules which are often not well known and communicated in
ways that are diﬃcult to identify from the outside.
3. Networks. Such rules can relate to the ways in which policymakers
interact with other actors, based for example on levels of trust built
through regular contact and exchanges of information.
4. Ideas. One way of thinking about the world, or a policy problem, can
be taken for granted or dominate discussion. Such dominance –
described with reference to terms such as paradigms, hegemons, or
core beliefs – provides the context for discussion of potential policy
solutions.
5. Context and events. Policymakers face socioeconomic conditions and
events over which they have limited control, but can interpret and
respond to them in diﬀerent ways.
Complexity theory is particularly relevant, because it provides an
interdisciplinary way to describe such dynamics within policymaking
environments (Cairney, 2012b). Key elements of a complex system in-
clude:
1. A complex system is greater than the sum of its parts; those parts are
interdependent; elements interact with each other, share informa-
tion and combine to produce systemic behaviour.
2. Some attempts to inﬂuence complex systems are dampened (nega-
tive feedback), and others are ampliﬁed (positive feedback). Small
actions can have large eﬀects and large actions small eﬀects.
3. Systems are sensitive to initial conditions that produce long-term
momentum or ‘path dependence’.
4. They exhibit ‘emergence’, or behaviour that results from the inter-
action between elements at a local level.
5. They contain ‘strange attractors’ or demonstrate extended regula-
rities of behaviour which may be interrupted by short bursts of
change (Geyer and Cairney, 2015; Cairney, 2012b; Geyer and
Rihani, 2010: 12; Mitchell, 2009; Mitleton-Kelly, 2003: 26; 35–6;
Sanderson, 2006: 117; Room, 2011: 6–7; Klijn, 2008: 314).
When applied to policymaking, this approach suggests that we focus
less on the role of individuals and more on the ways in which they
interact to produce system-wide behaviour. At this system level, we can
identify the limited extent to which any central government can control
the policy process and its outcomes (Cairney, 2012b). For example,
positive and negative feedback can be linked to ‘disproportionate in-
formation processing’, in which policymakers can receive the same
amount of information over time, but ignore it for long periods (ne-
gative feedback) before paying disproportionate attention (positive
feedback) (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005; Baumgartner and Jones,
2009; Baumgartner et al., 2014). This dynamic highlights key limits to
the controlling capacity of the state given the tendency of policymakers
to have to pay attention to a small proportion of their responsibilities in
a sequential manner (Cairney et al., 2019). Major and sudden change is
possible, but so too are long periods of unchanging behaviour.
Or, the same governmental intervention can have a minimal or
maximal eﬀect, depending on how it is dampened or magniﬁed within a
complex system. Indeed, complex systems often seem to have ‘self-or-
ganising capacities’, which suggests that ‘law-like behaviour is diﬃcult
to identify … A policy that was successful in one context may not have
the same eﬀect in another’ (Cairney, 2012b: 349). Systems exhibit path
dependence, or the tendency for events and decisions made in the past
to contribute to the formation of institutions that inﬂuence current
practices (Pierson, 2000; Mettler and SoRelle, 2018). This wider context
is a ‘ﬁtness landscape’ that only some actors can understand and re-
spond to eﬀectively, and over which policymakers have limited control
(Room, 2011, 2016).
Further, interdisciplinary studies of complex systems focus parti-
cularly on ‘emergence’. When applied to policymaking, a key assump-
tion is that policy outcomes ‘emerge’ from the interactions between
many actors, based on the rules communicated locally, often with
limited reference to the ‘centre’. Indeed, this idea resonates with the
literature on policy implementation and governance, in which local
actors are unable or unwilling to deliver all central government aims,
and central governments can only oversee the implementation of some
(Lipsky, 1980; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 6).
4.1. A complex energy policymaking system or complex energy system?
Overall, the story generally told by complexity theorists is of a
system with many actors, interacting with each other in diﬀerent parts
of a system which are not easily subject to central control, reproducing
rules which produce long periods of policymaking regularity, and
communicating rules prompting emergent and often unpredictable be-
haviour with profound consequences. Governments would struggle to
understand far less control such a system, and the law in the books
makes an important but highly unclear contribution.
This focus on complex policymaking systems is useful, but in-
complete until it fosters further interdisciplinary dialogue about the
application of complexity thinking to energy. When energy scholars
take a ‘whole systems’ approach, their research relates generally to
‘socio-technical systems’ in which the main relationship is between (a)
technology/infrastructure, and (b) social and industry behaviour. There
is much attention to the concept of ‘sustainability transitions research’
(Köhler et al., 2019), but only infrequent attempts to explore the role of
government and policymaking in the transition to a low carbon energy
system (Chilvers et al., 2017; Markard et al., 2016). Understanding the
connection between complex systems and whole systems thinking is
vital to interdisciplinary research, but that agenda has only just begun.
5. Conclusion and policy implications: the law will inﬂuence key
issues in energy supply and demand, but how?
Our study of energy law and policy shows how to communicate
disciplinary insights to an interdisciplinary audience. It also presents a
dilemma for that audience, since it is relatively simple to pick up and
use a description of the division of responsibilities between diﬀerent
governments, but in the knowledge that it will tell us comparatively
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little about policy responsibilities in practice. Further, although one
could stop at the next level, to investigate the ways in which govern-
ments make policy individually and in cooperation with each other, it
would be diﬃcult to do so, because such a large part of the inter-
disciplinary study of energy is devoted to thinking about how every-
thing connects in a system. To make a diﬀerence to interdisciplinary
energy studies, we need to compare the ways in which each discipline
describes complexity and whole systems approaches.
Energy law scholarship has begun to draw upon interdisciplinary
insights to understand the complex aims of energy law, the multiple
sites in which energy law is produced, and the contextually-speciﬁc
conditions under which energy law interventions are likely to be ef-
fective. For instance, Heﬀron and Talus (2016) acknowledge the com-
plexities arising from the interaction of diﬀerent energy sources, the
intertwining of the energy sector and the wider economy, the patch-
work of legal rules and concepts brought to bear upon energy regula-
tion, the interaction of international, national and local decision-ma-
kers, and the various inﬂuences operating upon them, as well as from
the multiple goals of energy policy (the ‘energy trilemma’). Such ana-
lysis underlines the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration to
understand how policy actors draw upon their legal resources to pro-
duce successful interventions in the energy system.
Some concluding examples help identify the high stakes when we
shift from conceptual discussion to empirical analysis of speciﬁc case
studies and events. For example, any focus on energy demand needs to
account for the millions of actors who, in the context of household
energy use, also constitute the electorate. There are political tensions in
making policies to reduce demand where this involves cost and in-
convenience for private actors who do not necessarily value the societal
returns achieved, and the political dynamics often diﬀer from policy to
regulate industrial demand. There are tensions around public percep-
tions of whose responsibility it is to take action – including local, de-
volved, national, or international government agencies – and govern-
ments can look like they are trying to shift responsibility to each other
or individuals and ﬁrms if they insist upon the limits of their legal
competence. There are multiple ways in which energy demand could be
regulated or inﬂuenced – including energy labelling and product/
building standards, emissions reduction measures, promotion of eﬃ-
cient generation, and buildings performance measures – but it is an area
of policy that is notoriously diﬀuse and lacking in co-ordination. In that
context, simply mapping the respective responsibilities on the page will
not help us understand energy demand in practice.
Further, a focus on Brexit in relation to energy supply highlights a
future that remains diﬃcult to predict, but the resolution of this diﬃ-
culty relates greatly to reducing uncertainty about how multi-level
policymaking is operating now. Greater certainty about current levels
of Europeanisation of energy policy would help us gauge the eﬀects of
Brexit. For example, the promotion of the internal energy market has
resulted in a signiﬁcant degree of harmonisation of regulatory rules and
structures in gas and electricity, as well as an increasing degree of
physical integration between UK and other European energy systems. It
is also signiﬁcant, though more self-contained, in relation to nuclear
energy, via Euratom, and renewable energy sources. It is least im-
portant in relation to fossil fuels, where there is limited direct EU
regulation other than in relation to security of supply, and where other
international legal instruments will remain a more signiﬁcant con-
straint on domestic policymaking.
This varying impact of Brexit will be ampliﬁed by diﬀerent levels of
UK and EU cooperation, from the UK's notiﬁcation of withdrawal from
Euratom but desire to continue to co-operate in relation to nuclear
safety and non-proliferation, to trade electricity and gas over inter-
connectors, and to link new UK carbon pricing mechanisms with the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (see Department for Exiting the European
Union, 2018: Title XI). On the other hand, in practice, there is a high
degree of coincidence between UK and EU energy policy driven by the
UK's key role in policy development, which suggests that Brexit itself -
understood as a set of formal constitutional and legal changes - is un-
likely to lead to a major shift in UK energy policy goals. Nevertheless, if
we understand Brexit in broader terms as a disruption to the expecta-
tions and assumptions that have driven and constrained the develop-
ment of energy policy, then the potential for policy change is both
greater and harder to predict.
One important way in which Brexit unsettles expectations relates to
the internal UK distribution of policymaking competences relevant to
the energy sector, and how decision-making powers being ‘repatriated’
from the EU level will be allocated as between the UK and devolved
levels. For example, since environmental competences impinging on the
energy sector are largely devolved, the Scottish Government will, prima
facie, see an expansion in its policymaking freedom and/or greater
leverage over the development of new British energy policies. However,
the removal of EU law as an external constraint on the UK level will
take out a key support for the Scottish Government in its promotion of a
low-carbon energy system in Scotland and the expansion of renewable
electricity generation. Some EU frameworks relevant to energy pol-
icymaking will also be replaced by new UK frameworks, including in
relation to emissions trading and state aids (see European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 12; Cabinet Oﬃce, 2018, Annex A), and
policymaking in devolved areas will be more vulnerable to new trade
agreements negotiated by the UK Government.
In this context, the lack of their own treaty-making competence, and
the absence of a formal set of intergovernmental arrangements
equivalent to those established in relation to EU policymaking, are
likely to constrain the ability of future Scottish governments to develop
a distinctive energy policy agenda. At the same time, the Scottish
Government continues to develop a distinct approach to policymaking
through initiatives such as a Just Transition Commission (JTC, of which
Karen Turner is a member). The JTC focuses on ‘fairness’ and improved
opportunities and wellbeing for all Scottish citizens while achieving
commitments on climate neutrality set out in the Climate Change
(Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Bill. Such new discussions of
a ‘just transition’ raise important issues about interdisciplinary under-
standing (Heﬀron and McCauley, 2018) and new dilemmas regarding
multi-level policymaking.
Finally, perhaps Brexit provides a ‘window of opportunity’ to
change policy and policymaking by, for example, clarifying responsi-
bilities and simplifying intergovernmental relationships. However, our
discussion of complex systems suggests that the key causes of energy
policy outcomes are not necessarily governmental. Delivery of energy
(and climate) policy outcomes tend to be unusually reliant on action by
business and private households. This focus reminds us to consider the
wider economic and socio-technical systems in which energy policy
takes place, and to accept that we are unable to predict what will
‘emerge’ from Brexit. We do not yet know what kind of energy re-
lationship the UK will have with the EU in future, what the short- and
medium-term economic impacts of Brexit will be, and how politicians
and regulators, energy companies and investors, or energy users will
respond to them. This underlines the importance of developing con-
ceptual models that are simple enough to communicate but detailed
enough to capture policymaking complexity.
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